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A long way to walk: bus boycotts in Alexandra, 1940-1945
Tomorrow awaits you
A long way to walk
Its useless talking
To gold propped ears.
Modikwe Dikobe.
Bus boycotts assumed central significance in the political struggles in urban areas
during the forties and fifties. The Alexandra boycott of 1957, which evoked sympathy
boycotts across the country, even in areas in which bus fares had not been increased,
reached the proportions of a major confrontation between the state on the one hand and
African communities and political organisations on the other.
Boycotts mobilised the energies of organisations of widely varied political complexions
While the question will be raised whether the involvement of these organisations placed
a burden upon the movements which they could not sustain, attempts to exploit the boyco
fc« understandable enough, given the strength of grass-roots commitment to the boycotts.
It is this commitment which needs to be explained. Why was it that thousands of peopl*
poorly fed and poorly clad, would walk up to twenty miles a day, often in heavy rains,
harrassed by police and officials, for periods lasting up to six weeks?
Part of the explanation lies in the economic condition of the African working class. A
penny on the bus fares, the common precipitant of boycotts, inflicted a direct and
serious injury on urban communities located a long way from the workplace. This injur-
was further compounded by the penalties which inadequate and inefficient transport
services imposed on factory workers, who sometimes had to wait for hours to get onto
the buses and who lost wages for being late for work. Other groups, like washerwomen,
lost incomes through the inefficiencies of the transport service. In general, women
were more heavily disadvantaged than men by the inadequate services and crowded condi-
tions on the buses and were prominent in the boycotts. In part, the boycotts assumed
significance because of the complexity of the working class communities in places like
C , Alexandra, which meant that solutions such as a lev>*»amposed on employers with the purp
of subsidising bus fares did not cover all classes of labour, nor the unemployed.
Moreover, such solutions disadvantaged all groups in areas like Alexandra.in favour of
groups living nearer town, for it increased the cost of their labour.
However, while the working class was the most important group in the boycotts, elements
of other classes were also important. Particularly in areas like Alexandra, where
Africans enjoyed freehold rights, a small but politically significant petty bourgeoisie
had been all but squeezed out of the transport field by the beginning of the war as a
result of developments towards a monopoly in the hands of white entrepreneurs. These
developments which created the opportunity to increase! bus fares worked simultaneously
to push black transporters out of the indsutry. During the
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war, African entrepreneurs had an immediate interest in trying to regain their
positions; some took a leading part in the boycott movements. Moreover, boycotts
provided a short-term bonanza to small-scale transporters; the owners of lorries
and horsecarts, were important providers of transport for boycotters. In sum, the
boycotts had support from all classes in a community like Alexandra.
Transport costs have always been an important component in the domestic economy of
urban African workers. The effects of state, including municipal policy, even
before the passage of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, was to locate a growing propor-
tion of the urban African work-force at considerable distances from the city centres.
In 1939, something over 80,000 blacks lived in Orlando, Kliptown and Alexandra.
The position was similar in Pretoria, where there had been a large-scale removal
of the black population of the city to locations like Lady Selbourne during the
1930's, and in Vereeniging and the Reef towns, though Reef locations were frequently
situated within three or four miles of the towns.
Whereas it was estimated that in the United Kingdom most working class households
spent not more than four per cent, and in London not more than two per cent on
transport, black workers in Johannesburg were spending between six and seven per
cent of family incomes on transport, and in the case of Alexandra as much as 9.5
per cent, f
The location of increasing numbers of the African working population at long distances
from the workplace made transportation a field of keen activity among small entre-
preneurs who found the small outlays and high returns, and - before the thirties -
absence of significant regulations, attractive. A multitude of taxis, private
transport "clubs" and even rickshaws (during an earlier period) plied the long hauls
between places like Kliptown and Alexandra and the city centre; by the late twenties,
small bus companies, at first owner-driven, had entered the field. During the
twenties, taxis serving Alexandra charged Is.3d. foi^ -the trip to Johannesburg; a bus
service was introduced in 1929 and charged 9d.; the appearance of a second bus
service in 1931 forced fares down to 6d. By the late thirties, the fares were down
to 4d. One of the consequences' of the development of bus services was that taxi
fares fell sharply; in 1943, taxis from Alexandra were charging 6d. and even 4d.
Relatively cheap transportation combined with comparatively low rentals made Alexandra
a viable proposition to black workers, and accounted in part for the rapid increase
in its population during the 1930s. But both factors began to change towards the
end of the decade. By the late thirties, rentals were becoming sufficiently high
for tenants1 associations to emerge as pressure groups,
Although bus fares fell during the 1930s, developments in the transport industry
threatened to expose the inhabitants of Alexandra to a radical increase in transport
costs. These developments must be explored if the full implications of the increases
which were attempted during the war are to be understood.
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The major legislative instrument of changes in transport was the Motor Carrier
Transportation Act of 1930.,TBefore the passage of the Act there had been little
regulation in carrier transport. R.G. Balloi, who ran buses and taxis during the
twenties and thirties, and was to play a role in the boycotts of the mid-forties,
records that
at that time there was no control. Each and every owner
could just run as he wished. This system made it difficult
for European Bus owners to operate....In 1931, the Transpor-
tation Act was enforced.... It compelled all owners to work
and operate according to one timetable and a stipulated fare.
This was done in order to do away with competition,
The primary purpose of the act was to protect the South African Railways from the
competition of road carriers,'^ but it also empowered the Board set up under its
aegis to issue certificates in order to limit competition in areas where there were
no railways.CY In 1932, it enunciated the policy of preventing
the establishment of such new transport undertakings within
areas or routes which are served by existing facilities,
and have as far as possible confined new applicants to the
spheres in which they can serve the public in a useful and
economic manner. f ^  !
The effects of the policy were apparent by the time the Board made its first report:
On review the local board by reducing the number of
vehicles or their frequency considerably lessened the
degree of excess which had previously existed, and by
imposing minimum fares on certain routes and regula-
ting the tariffs of charges on which carriers operated,
a greater degree of stability and standardisation was
achieved, fa
For example the seven vehicles plying between Johannesburg and Germiston at the end
of 1932 were reduced .to four; the two between Johannesburg and Boksburg West ceased
operating. Of the 24 seven-seat carriers (taxis) operating between Krugersdorp and
Krugersdorp West 12 were granted carrier certificates and the others "ceased operation
As the Board admitted in its report the following year, "the elimination of wasteful
competition resulted in hardship to certain carriers...."
One of the effectscof these regulations was a "marked increase in the use of motor
cars as distinct from omnibuses."(|2. Throughout the thirties, the Board complained
of the "operation of taxis and private cars in contravention of the Act" (Ijy
and asserted furthermore that the
alarm felt by the established rail or motor services at
inroads of the donkey- or ox-wagon into traffic legiti-
mately belonging to the established carrier is not ex-
agerated.
The Act was only tightened up sufficiently to effectively prevent taxis from com-
peting with buses when it was amended in 1941. Taxis could, in suitable conditions,
force bus fares down. Thus on the route between Germiston station and the location
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the taxis now operate virtually as buses, departing
from either terminus at regular intervals.... The
bus owners who hold certificates for this route have
been obliged to reduce their fares to an uneconomic
level in an endeavour to maintain their services
until such time as the provisions under the Act
relating to the operation of taxis shall have been
amended. ( /£
The certification policy of the Board, while ostensibly committed to the principles
of "stability and standardisation" operated in effect to the benefit of white ope-
rators. The Board was not openly racist, and indeed it averred that, other things
being equal it would grant certificates to blacks wishing to operate services for
blacks.
but it would be a very unsound policy and contrary
to the spirit of the Act if natives were to be
granted certificates merely because they are natives
wishing to serve natives. &
While blacks were given certificates to operate in the rural areas (some of these
were extremely lucrative, for instance the Zwane brothers' enterprise in the Eastern
Transvaal) and a few, like Dick. Mathole and R.G. Baloyi,acquired certificates to run
the highly profitable routes between the large cities and the locations, white
operators rapidly came to dominate these urban routes. The Board claimed that it
protected "established" operators against newcomers, but in fact all operators
started on a small scale and could only become "established" through support from
the Board. The Board itself averred that before the Act came into operation, "an
extremely small outlay was required in order to enter the transportation field..."/7
The transport field was invaded by marginal elements during the twenties and thirties
many bore Afrikaner and Italian surnames; in the countryside, landless whites often
turned to transportation (or rather returned, for they had been transport riders up
till the rinderpest epidemic in 1896.) iX ^..
There were only two bus services operating on the Johannesburg-Alexandra route when
the Board commenced operation. By 1943, there were seven, none controlled by
Africans, though Baloyi's United Bus Company, in which Mathole held shares, had only
recently been placed in liquidation. It is true that African entrepreneurs, with
less access to capital than whites, were more vulnerable to "market forces", but
those forces were certainly strengthened by the Board's policy. It hardly needs
stating that no black ever sat on either the central or local boards.
The Motor Transport Owners' Association was formed during the mid-thirties; by
1937, its representatives were attending meetings of the Board to "oppose the
applications of newcomers to the transport industry." fQ By the beginning of the
war, transporters on the Alexandra run had organised themselves into the City-
Alexandra Non-European Passenger Service, which operated as a cartel.
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Despite these discouragements, black entrepreneurs made persistent efforts through-
out the thirties and forties to acquire certificates to an extent that irritated
"established" operators who had to go to the effort of opposing their applications.
The Board shared this irritation. It noted that notwithstanding the fact that
throughout the country adequate transport facilities
are provided between native locations and the larger
cities, it is significant that native applicants
and their supporters do not appreciate the basic
principles of the Act and submit new applications
regardless of existing facilities. (,£| i
The Board opined : that there was a need for
some simple and equitable system of costs whereby
existing operators who render adequate services be
.protected against wilful, and repeated attempts, by
new applicants, to cripple such operators finan-
cially if they themselves cannot also by fair
means or foul, obtain authority to operate a
service over the same route.... 7-2-
A provision dropped from the original Act in 1932 was reintroduced in 1941 whereby
applicants for certificates could be required to deposit up to £100 to compensate
existing operators for the costs of opposing new applications. 4>0 Amendments were
also introduced in 1941 which had the effect of tightening up controls over the
operation of cars for hire."Z^ In sum, by the beginning of the war, passenger
services had been concentrated in the hands of a cartel of bus companies dominated
by whites. Black entrepreneurs had been squeezed out of the services which they
had pioneered a decade earlier. Small-scale entrepreneurs like taxi-owners, were
being increasingly subjected to controls which, while not eliminating them, forced
them to the edges of the field.
Notwithstanding these tendencies, bus fares remained remarkably stable during the
thirties, and indeed actually declined, at least^in Alexandra. But the reorgani-
sation of the industry created a structure within which increases in fares could be
made without running the risk that transporters outside the cartel could uncercut
the "established carrier." 'The considerable influx of. people into Alexandra from
shortly before the war, combined with a decline in private transport usage (due to
the restrictions on petrol and the difficulties in obtaining tyres) after the war
broke out, provided the opportunity to put up prices. *»v
The bus owners justified the increase in fares which they imposed late in 1939
on the grounds that costs had radically increased since the beginning of the war.
This claim is difficult to assess. It is perfectly true that there was an in-
crease in costs, but there was also a massive increase in demands for transport;
evidence of over-crowding may be deduced as much from the statistics provided
by the bus owners to the Bus Commission of 1943 as from the complaints of commuters
and African organisations.HOMunicipal bus services faced equivalent if not
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greater increases in costs (and actually claimed larger increases), yet with the
exception of a single route in Johannesburg, they either showed a profit in 1941
or 1942 where previously they had shown losses,, or increased their profits, or
decreased their losses. ^ -/The Sunday Times reported that £1 shares in a bus com-
pany (not running on the Alexandra route) had increased in value to £200, and that
after subtracting a generous managerial remuneration, the company was providing a
20% return on investment. 2o The value of the assets of the Alexandra operators
was estimated at £36,946 in 1943; (early in 1945, these and the certificates were
offered to the Johannesburg Municipality for £250,000, and sold to a private
consortium for £176,000 in 1945. It was estimated that the value of certifica-
tes (in which there was a lively market) varied between £2000 and £2750 each. ^ O
While both these sums were probably inflated, they indicate the expectations en-
tertained by transporters of the profitability of the routes immediately after a
damaging boycott.
The claim for increased bus fares rested, not so much on increased costs as on
the right of the companies to get a 15 per cent return on capital and remuneration
for managerial services, gl The structural basis for this claim lay in the trans-
formation of the bus companies over the course of the thirties into fully fledged
capitalist firms with exclusive control over the industry.
The exclusion of black entrepreneurs from the transportation field provided an
incentive for them to participate in boycotts or stoppages. On one occasion,
though it does not seem to have been typical, white-owned buses were prevented
from entering Eastwood, Pretoria. According to the Bus Commission, the obstruct-
ion was "organised by an African who was.planning to obtain certificates. T...
in order to introduce a bus service of his own." J2_ It is also significant that
the incidence of boycotts was high in places like Alexandra, where Africans could
hold property, and where accordingly small black capitalist interest tended to
coagulate.
Prominent among would-be transporters were important members of the African
National Congress. Aside from Balloi,.who was treasurer-general of the A.N.C.
during the war, the president-general himself Dr* A.B. Xuma, was interested in
acquiring interests in the transport industry. Thus early in the war, Balloi
informed Xuma of his intention to sell his bus certificates in the United Bus
Service (at that stage on the verge of bankcruptcy) which operated between
Alexandra and Johannesburg. Xuma approached Dr. Moroka, his predecessor as
president-general, to suggest that they, together with Balloi, should form a
partnership: "this proposition is a much more profitable business than a general
dealerfs licence".^^ Xuma approached Mathole, proprietor of the Eastern Bus
Service, with an offer to buy his shares in the United Bus Service. $*£ When the
United Bus Service was placed under judicial management, Xuma received copies of
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the judicial manager's reports. Approaches to the president-general were made
by other entrepreneurs; thus the Clermont Township Aid .Fund tries to interest
Xuma in the formation of a transport company in 1941. ** C.S. Ramohanoe, the
president of the A.N.C. in the Transvaal, had applied for a passenger certificate
in 1935, though it is not clear whether he secured one. 3** In mid-1945, when the
"bus question11 began stirring again in Alexandra, Baloyi accused him of being an
employee of the Public Utility Transport Corporation.?*(
These interests were stimulated by the boycotts. In evidence to the Bus Commis-
sion in 1943, Baloyi said he was prepared to run a service at the old fare.^J*
During the later stages of the Alexandra boycott of 1944, a group of African
businessmen applied for certificates, and affirmed that they could run a service
at the old fares-*? Baloyi held the position of chairman of the non-European
section of the Alexandra Emergency Transport Committee.
Xuma justified his commercial ventures with nationalist rhetoric. Writing to
Balloi, he argued that it would refleot badly if people said he had gone backrupt:
"We cannot afford to see you, or any of our progressive people disappear from the
limelight or fail to lead in certain directions" and, (pjulling together, we can
do a great deal, not only for ourserves, but for our people in general." /f.O
Xuma, of course, saw a direct connexion between the political aspirations of the
African people and the struggles of an aspiring petty bourgeoisie: speaking of
Alexandra, he said, "We have our population largely consisting of people who
were struggling to get freehold title to the land, thereby building a hope of a
future in the hearts of their child [ren].11 4 f
While the black petty bourgeoisie, including African political leaders, may have
had an interest in the boycotts as a means to returning to activities from which
they had been extruded, it would be a mistake to see them as the dominant group in
the boycott movements. It would be incorrect.tor"see the boycotts simply as the
effects of small entrepreneurs mobilising mass support from among the working
class in order to help defeat their white rivals. For if the boycotts present
some of the features of a trade war, it was one in which the considers had an
interest which lay beyond those of the combatants. The boycotts were affected
by the participation of the petty bourgeoisie; it is possible that the different
committees which had developed by the.1944 boycott had their constituencies in
different classes, and that their direction was influenced by these political
divisions. But the major significance of the boycotts lay in the importance
which they assumed to the working classes, who initiated the boycott movements
and sustained them.
Transport costs, and the quality of transport services, raised fundamental issues
to urban black workers, irrespective of whether or not they opened the way back
into the industry for black transporters. The latter might have been satisfied
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by a relaxation of the policy pursued by the Motor Transportation Board, and,
given the same protection afforded to white entrepreneurs, black transporters
with sufficient capital might have found themselves beneficiaries of that con-
junction of circumstances - monopolistic control over the industry and rising
costs - which would give them the opportunity to take advantage.of an increase
in fares. Of course, things were going the other way.for the African petty
bourgeoisie, which accounts for the increasing convergence of their interests with
the working class.
The changes in the transport industry during the 1930s struck at the existence
of working class communities located at a distance from the cities, especially
those dependent on bus transport. (Areas served by the.S.A.R. enjoyed relati-
vely low-cost transport, and were never prominent in initiating boycotts, though
in 1944 an attempt was made to organise a sympathy boycott in Orlando, and in
1957, Orlando came out strongly in sympathy with Alexandra.)
The costs of all items of subsistence increased rapidly during the early war
period. t{Z- But it was not simply that the proposals to increase fares by a penny
made late in 1939 would further strain the seriously eroded wages of urban
workers, though this is true. Beyond the immediate proposals, the really
threatening aspect was that the assumptions on which the claims for fare in-
creases were made indicated no limits to the rise in transport costs. On the
assumption that 4d. for a ten-mile ride was cheap (the "lowest fare in the Union",
claimed the bus companies), 5d. was also cheap. The bus companies ennunciated
the doctrine that a penny a mile was a reasonable fare, which would suggest that
they were aiming at lOd. for the fare between Alexandra and the City. But there
was no reason why the fares should stop there, particularly after the report of
the Bus Commission of 1943 which lent legitimacy to the claims of transporters for
a "reasonable" return on capital and for managerial services, tlty The long-term
implication of the proposal to increase fares was that transport costs could
escalate to the point where places like Alexandra might cease to be viable
locations for black workers, particularly the poorest classes. The viability of
Alexandra was a vital issuo^to the urban African.working class. Over-riding
even its significance as a free-hold and.more or less self-governing area, was
its importance to the black labour force as an uncomfortable-dormitory on the
peripheries of the city, beyond the reach of urban slum-clearing regulations and
influx controls (of which it was in part the product.) Difficult to police,
attracting the marginal elements in African urban society, Alexandra, like the
squatter camps which grew up around South African cities during the war, provided
a precarious shelter in the social and economic revolution sweeping over country-
side and city.
Fare increases constituted only part of the problem. Whereas Alexandra had been
a cheap place to stay during the 1930s, by 1943 the average rent for certain classes
of accommodation was more expensive than the overall Johannesburg average though
still much cheaper than Sophiatown. /i£ O n e °f t n e reasons was the bonding of Afric,
owned property to building societies; in 1943 something like a fifth of the lots in
Alexandra were held under mortgage by blacks and colour eds .^ £-0 Thus workers living
in places like Alexandra during the war years were caught in a swirling eddy of
forces, partly induced by the war, but also created by the pace of capitalist
development.
Alexandra was threatened more directly by a plan to remove it. The City Council
had during the thirties appointed a commission headed by Judge Feetham to investi-
gate the possibility of removing the township. Feetham had recommended against
removal, but in July, 1938, the Council had resolved that a conference should be
held to consider "ways and means of dealing with Alexandra Township". /f7 In 1943,
the Council decided to support a report which recommended the "complete abolition
of Alexandra"; the expropriation of all stands (land-holders were to be offered
stands in another area and compensation for improvements; tenants were to be removed
to municipally controlled locations or made to "depart from the area.")ffi
The removal of Alexandra surfaced as an issue during the 1944 boycott Aough it
had much earlier provided the occasion for resistance; like the extrusion of the
African entrepreneurs from the transport industry, it provided an area of collabo-
ration between the black petty-bourgeoisie and the working class.
By early wartime, Alexandra was becoming not only much larger, but also composed in
such a way that one/speak of an ensemble of quite different and distinctive interes
groups which could provide a constituency for community political action. An
African community was assembling on the peripheries of the major cities in a form
which could not be predicted from the constitution of the labour force qua labour
force. Aside from the petty-bourgeoise element^the working class had assumed a
complexity which at once made its administration more difficult to the authorities,
and also enabled the community to act with a greater range of resources than were
available in simpler communities. The presence of large numbers of work-seekers,
the influx of people from both rural areas and areas nearer the city; the employment
of women in areas outside of domestic service, and not least the importance of
transportation in the manifold activities of the household increased both the
resources and the demands which the community made on transport and other services,
and solutions to transport problems became more difficult to achieve unilaterally
by administrative fiat.
The importance of women in the boycotts can scarcely be exagerated. They were
increasingly being employed in factories, which means that a flexible and efficient
transport system became crucial in the domestic economy of Alexandra. The special
.../10...
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needs of women working in factories and running homes were prominent in the
complaints about the transport system. Moreover, many women employed in domestic
service were living with their families and doing piecework washing directly
affected their earning capacity. For these, the overcrowding on the buses, the
long delays, and the "no-stages" system hit at incomes and physical well-being.
Many worked in the middle-class suburbs mid-way between Alexandra and the City;
not only did they have to pay a full fare to Orange Grove or Houghton, but,
because of the struggle to get onto the buses, they would have to take a bus to
the city in the afternoon in order to be assured of a seat on the journey home.
And where women were living-in domestic servants, the bus service was important
in maintaining some sort of viable family life; hence the resentments against
the higher fares charged over weekends -/''super fat yielding days".
Alexandra was politically and administratively bursting out of the framework of
formal administrative divisions and structures. The township was nominally
administered by the Alexandra Health Committee, itself something of an adminis-
trative anomaly. The Committee was an agency of the Transvaal Province which
however, had as its chairman Abram Fischer, recently recruited to the Communist
Party, and as its part-time medical officer of health the president-general of
the African National Congress - as well as an array of African land-holders and
other interest groups represented on it. In effect, Alexandra governed itself.
Both the complexity of the community and the inadequacy of outside control must
be taken into account in understanding the capacity of the township to make the
initiatives that surfaced in the boycotts; they are as important as the grinding
poverty and the wretched living conditions in accounting for the power of the
boycott movements.
The boycott movement in Alexandra proceeded quite slowly at first. The seven
operators on the Johannesburg-Alexandra route increased fares from Ad. to 5d.
late in 1939, and this fare was accepted by commuters until August, 1940, when
they boycotted the services with such effect that the 4d. fare was restored.
The delay raises problems in understanding the evolution of the boycott organi
sations. Xuma records that after the increase was granted
Further representations were made without success. Protest
meetings were organised and eventually a bus boycott took
place on 4th August, 1940. The boycott was successful and
4d. was again charged and the levy to bus owners was reduced
once more to 2/6 per bus per day. 4^2
.../ll...
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This seems to suggest that committees interested in transport problems attempted
to negotiate issues before resorting to boycotts. During the previous year, a
deputation from the Transport Action Committee which inluded Gaur Radebe and
C.S. Ramohanoe had met the Johannesburg City Council's Tramways and Lighting
Committee to complain about the municipal transport system.
The 1940 boycott was not reported in the press, and passing references to it in
official reports are very brief. But the fact that it generated no "news" would
seem to indicate that it passed without incident, lasted a short time, and was
highly successful: the four-penny fare was restored and held for two years.
It is not certain whether the boycott assumed the form of later boycotts, i.e.
the refusal to use the buses combined with action against would-be commuters.
In later boycotts there was some experimentation with different methods before
the common form was established.
The next episode in Alexandra followed an increase in the fare on October 15,
1942. This time there do not seem to have been any preliminary negotiations.
Commuters refused to pay the extra fare. The police were called in; passengers
on one bus paid up. There were reports of "minor disturbances" arising from
attempts to prevent people from using buses; three policemen were slightly
injured and five buses were damaged. A conference was held between the bus
owners and "residents." The bus owners brushed the incident aside as the work
of "agitators". However they announced that the 4d. fare would be restored, but
that the route would be shortened, v ^
The boycotts demonstrated the effectiveness, of popular action in holding the fares
down, though the victory of 1942 was achieved at some cost to the commuters.
(It seems that the route was restored to its previous length by the time the 1943
boycott began.) Neither displayed the full power either of the boycotters nor
the opposing forces of the transport companies. They were not sufficiently pro-
tracted to involve the intervention of the state nor the complex array of political
groups, including white liberal and left-wing groups, which were later to mobilise
"public opinion" into postures - sometimes alternating postures - of sympathy and
hostility towards the urban working classes.
These two episodes, like many others which continue down to the present, exhibited
the form of riots with a specific focus rather than the more elaborate processes
which came to be involved in the boycotts of 1943, 1944 and 1957 in Alexandra and
similar movements elsewhere. Yet they should not be viewed simply as preludes
to these larger movements. In a "statistical" sense they are less impressive than
the great set-piece boycotts of later years. But it should be recognised that
they exemplify more accurately than these more celebrated episodes the thousands
.../12...
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of occasions on which black men have attempted to intervene actively in the
direction of their lives, and that they constituted the forces which were
indispensable in providing these larger movements with their momentum.
At the same time, they illustrate the problems intrinsic to direct community-
based popular action, even when such action achieves a tangible objective;
they won no structural alteration in the situation of the community, nor even
a significant expansion in the political power of the community over decisions
affecting it.
The very successes of the boycotts attest to their weakness; the temporary
retreat of the bus owners over the issue of fares did not jeopardise their
control over transport, which remained unassailed, though the damage to the
buses posed the threat of destroying the capital investments of bus owners,
and the boycotts demonstrated their importance as a threat to profits. Both
threats delivered the capacity to peg fares, but it was a limited power which
r . could not in itself precipitate more far-reaching changes.
The boycotts which took place during the next few years brought larger forces
into play on both sides. The power of the bus operators was consolidated by
the intervention of the state, and the movement set in train for the concentration
of control in the industry with the state as a major partner. To anticipate a
little, the alliances through which broader and more concerted boycott action
became mobilised took the direction of boycotts out of the hands of the boycotters :
the groups which acted on behalf of the boycotters in the complicated negotiations
involving local authorities, government departments and even the cabinet were
increasingly remote from the boycott communities. It will be suggested that
the effect of this change may have been to steer the boycotts away from some
directions which they might otherwise have taken.
('•' The boycotts became a problem, a resource, an r5*sue which reverberated in the
political transactions of the African National Congress, left-wing groups, white
liberal associations and various fractions of the state. But the base was always
the precarious and fragile one of men and women vho were prepared to walk to and
from work each day. True, outside intervention provided supports for the boy-
cotters which were crucial to sustaining their effort; nonetheless, their inter-
vention took the initiative away from those immediately involved. It is .with
these problems in mind that the boycotts of 1943 and 1944 will be considered.
The 1943 boycott began on August 3 following an increase in fares to 5d. Meetings
were held the previous day, both in the township and in the city. Lapel badges
stating "We Pay 4d." were printed and distributed. J.B. Marks, later a member of
the finergency Transport Committee addressed a meeting at the Noord Street bus
terminus, and asked for "justice"; he had kept books for bus owners for five
years, he declared, and these showed "surplus profits." J £ Lorentz, the coordinate
.../13...
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of the bus companies, said he had been approached by "spokesmen", but that the
matter had been "thrashed out." % f
In a statement to the press the following day, A.E.P. Fish of the Alexandra Worker:
Union, declared that either the fares should remain at 4d. or else the service
should be operated by the Alexandra Health Committee for the benefit of the resi-
dents; the profits could be used for the improvement of the service. The Commit-
tee, he said, was prepared to take it over. Fish drew attention to low wages;
to the "no stage" system; to over-crowding on the buses, and said that economies
could be introduced, for instance by employing black inspectors.
By the 4th a ferry service had begun transporting boycotters. Senator Basner,
Margaret and William Ballinger, Ellen Hellman, Hilda Ruper and Colin Legum
appealed to the public to provide a ferry service, and the Star published a
telephone number and other information necessary to give effect to the appeal.
The City Council asked employers to be "reasonable" towards employees coming late
to work.
On the following day, 2,000 boycotters got lifts; the Emergency Transport Commit-
tee, formed under Basner's chairmanship, mobilised fifty cars and set about
applying for petrol rations. Vincent Swart, later associated with the Trotskyite
Movement for Democracy of Content, raised £100 to hire carts and horses. On
August 3, 3,000 boycotters were lifted to work.6© The police issued a statement
to the effect that the boycott had caused no disorder, and the next day Basner
returned the compliment: "They Mthe police") have been perfectly marvellous and
their tact has helped avoid any trouble." hi The traffic department overlooked
contraventions of regulations against over-crowding in motor cars. Many firms
provided transport for black workers or loaned them bicycles. By the 6th, some
workers had lost their jobs. o^-The Department of Native Affairs asked employers
to reinstate them, an appeal to which.P. van de^JJijl, Minister of Native Affairs,
added his authority, [fi The Rand Daily Mail fervently endorsed the appeal "in the
confidence that employers will not make their natives suffer...."
In this atmosphere of amity, negotiations between the parties to the dispute slowly
bogged down. The companies maintained that the service was cheap ... the "lowest
fare in the Union" declared its spokesman, but offered to retain the 4d. fare if
the route were shortened by a mile. ^ ) Basner proposed that the state - either
central or local authorities - should subsidise transport, £ £ The Johannesburg
City Council was not interested in providing cheap transport to Alexandra; it
wanted Alexandra removed altogether, though as an immediate measure, it decided
to provide a service to those commuters who were prepared to wait until 7.30 p.m.
when buses from the Sophiatown route would be made available. 6? ( The Labour group
in the Council proposed that a municipal service should be installed between
Bramley (over a mile from Alexandra) and Yeoville (three miles from the City) and
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that the Prime Minister should use war-time emergency regulations to restore the
service at the old fare.
By August 8, there was deadlock. The settlement proposed by the bus owners was
rejected; they retaliated by returning the buses to service despite an appeal by
Basner that this should not be done until the issue had been resolved. £ff A mass
meeting was held in Alexandra on the 9th, and a procession of more than 10,000
people, including many women and children, marched in a column more than 2 miles
long to the Noord Street terminus, where oranges and pamphlets were distributed by
members of the emergency committee.7^ The procession marked the end of the boycott.
On the 11th, the Government announced that a commission of inquiry was to be held,
and that fares were to be pegged at 4d. pending its findings. Xuma described
the "settlement" as a "great victory", declaring that the "exemplary behaviour
of the residents had won great sympathy." 7/
The description was not merely premature; it legitimised the removal of the issue
to an official arena of debate, out of reach of direct action. With its third
boycott in three years, Alexandra had attracted the attention of the state and
African political organisations, and had begun to involve white liberal and
radical groups. While some of the ideas for a "solution" to the problems of
transport were rehearsed during the boycott (including the one eventually adopted -
Basnerfs proposal that the state should subsidise the companies) none of the positio
taken up in later boycotts were clearly defined. It is not even very clear how far
the 1943 episode assumed the form characteristic of later boycotts, the walk to and
from work. While many people must have walked in 1943, there are no reports of
the columns of marchers which were the remarkable feature of later boycotts. It
is possible that the procession of the 9th may have suggested the form which
boycotts later assumed.
The Commission created the settings in which thejpransport problems of urban
blacks became officially defined. These settings disposed of a resolution of
the "transport problem" in ways which vitiated the possibility of the boycott
movement generating radical action within African communities. The announcement
of the Commission signalled the beginning of a search for a consensus between the
state, the transport industry, Johannesburg industry and African and liberal
political organisations. As Xuma's statement suggested, the A.N.C. leadership
was as interested in a settlement as the official bodies and capitalist interests.
From the A.N.C.fs point of view, a "settlement" won by orderly and punctually
terminated protest could serve to legitimise African participation in government.
As they became processed through the machinery of the Commission, the "transport
problems" of the township became abstracted from the political struggles of the
community. What is interesting is not that the hypostatisation of this issue
should have been attempted by the state and white economic interests, but that
this framework should have been accepted with little disagreement by organisations
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like the A.N.C., the liberals and most groups on the left.
The immediate effect of the establishment of the Commission was to foreclose the
possibility that the agitation in Alexandra might spread to other areas where the
transport situation was as bad if not worse; significantly the terms of reference
of the Commission covered the whole of the Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Vereeniging
region. 7 2 T*16 Commission transferred the conflict into a setting in which popular
action was by definition excluded; and the readiness of African political organisa-
tions to testify before it legitimised this removal. On the other hand, real
problems were raised, then as later, about the limitations of the boycott as a
weapon in community political struggles which suggests that Xuma may have been
right to grasp whatever occasions became available to negotiate piecemeal improve-
ments .
The Commission was directed to inquiry whether fares, routes, and conditions of
service on the Witwatersrand, Pretoria and Vereeniging, were "fair.and reasonable",
and whether fares were "within the means of passengers." "7*? r^ie Commission was
thus precluded from an inquiry into the effects of segregation on the position of
the African working class; from an inquiry into the structure of the transport
industry and from investigating the possibility of alternative methods of organising
the transport industry. In addition to these impediments to a broad-ranging
inquiry, the Commission adopted a protective posture towards the transport industry
and towards the Road Transportation Board which assisted in the preparation of the
report."7T" While collecting valuable and important information about the conditions
of the black working class, the Commission lent its authority to a conservative
resolution of the issue which deeply influenced both the reorganisation of the
industry (though it did not make explicit recommendations in this respect) and
affected the nature of future boycotts.
The Commission protected the bus owners in several ways. When the bus owners
declined to place their books before the Commission in public session, its
chairman decided not to compel them to do so, despite reservations about the value
of the evidence voluntarily submitted. "7f> After some initial reluctance, the
Commission permitted counsel to represent different interests but decided to hear
evidence on the financial position of the companies in camera, whereupon counsel
representing African groups withdrew. *7v The Commission considered the records
of the companies inadequate to form an opinion about their financial viability,
and made a recommendation to the effect that the Road Transportation Board should
attach a condition to certificates that "accurate accounts be kept of revenue and
expenditure." / 7 Yet on the basis of evidence which it regarded as unsatisfactory,
the Commission recommended fare increases on the Alexandra route over week-ends, on
the Pretoria-Atteridgeville route for both week-ends and week-days, and sanctioned
the increase of week-end fares on other routes in the Pretoria area. f$
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Perhaps the most important outcome of the Commission's deliberations was its
acceptance of the legitimacy of a return of 15 per cent on capital plus managerial
remuneration to each operator of £1,000 per annum.79 In effect the Commission
was conceding to the bus owners the right to determine the level of profits under
monopolistic conditions.
Again, it is not surprising that this concession should have been made, but it is
remarkable that the submissions of most of the parties which gave evidence to the
Commission should have prefigurei such a conclusion. Most of the evidence reported
in the press lay stress on the poverty of the African urban community, without
pursuing any analysis of the structural bases of the transport industry or the
position of the working class within the political economy. The stalwart of the
Fourth International (Johannesburg branch), H. Jaffee, submitted an interesting
critique of working class transport and housing, though his recommendations would
have required a revolution to turn out very differently from the solutions later
preferred by the Federated Chamber of Industries. (Both wanted nationalisation
of transport.)
Mr. Fish did not give evidence, and no one else took up the idea he had voiced
earlier of community control over transport. Nor did Radebe of the Transport
Action Committee give evidence. Only Baloyi, who wore his interests on his sleeve,
suggested that the keen edge of African competition would cut fares down.p /
On November 15, seven months after the Commissionreported, the fares on the
Alexandra route were raised by a penny. The fare increase was supposed to be
carried by employers; on the 10th, the Government had issued a proclamation to this
effect under war emergency regulations.§2, Despite this divisive ploy, protest
meetings held in locations and townships around Johannesburg decided that even those
not affected by the increase would take part in the boycotts - casual labourers and
especially washerwomen would find it difficult to ciaim the subsidy, and in any
case the unemployed and school-children would not be eligible to claim. S 3 The
boycott was not viewed simply as a form of pressure on the companies; Xuma explained
that it was intended to "bring to public notice the deplorable conditions under
which the Natives live"£i^and Basner issued a statement about the cost of living to
blacks.
The boycott was more clearly premeditated, more openly publicised, and more coherently
organised than the earlier movements,So and the spirit of amity which had characterise
the boycott of 1943 was absent from the beginning. The police la}} down an opening
barrage by arresting many "native vagrants" on the eve of the boycott, and lorry-
loads of policement arrived in Alexandra at 3 a.m. on the 15th to discourage the
boycott.9 f The boycotters had announced their intention of marching in procession
to the city; the police read a proclamation prohibiting "gatherings or processions"
of more than 20 persons, whereupon the boycotters broke up into smaller parties. At
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a meeting to organise a sympathy boycott in Orlando, Paul Mosaka, Kumalo, and
Self Mpuru were arrested. ^  $ Despite these discouragements something like 10,000
people took part in the boycott from the beginning. (There were also providential
discouragements - it rained on 20 days that November, and there was at least one
severe hailstorm.)
A lift scheme by sympathetic whites organised by the Emergency Transport Committee
began operating on November 18th; by the 21st, lifters were being stopped and
questioned by Road Transportation Board officials, and a week later many received
letters alleging contraventions of the Transportation Act. TO By mid-December, the
bus owners were concerned with the conveyance of boycotters in lorries; instructions
were issued on the 19th to prosecute such persons and stop supplying them with
petrol; the Transportation Board also withdrew certificates from 15 black owners of
lorries and cars who were charged with having conveyed boycotters for profit.^1
The drivers alleged intimidation. In response to this threat the Emergency Transport
Committee replaced motor vehicles with horse-drawn trolleys (not subject to the
provisions of the Act) hired for £1 a day from Alexandra residents.
The boycott set off a series of debates, negotiations, proposals, and deputations
which continued throughout November and December. The Johannesburg City Council
debated the matter on November 25.*T\5 T n e provincial executive of the Labour Party
protested against the actions of the Native Affairs Department and the Transportar
tion Board, and arranged a deputation to meet the Board.Q^tt The Campaign for
Rights and Justice, a body affiliated to 140 organisations, set up to "fight against
attacks upon Democracy and for removal of all disabilities which at present militate
against the full use of the human resources of the country", which had helped
motorists prosecuted by the Board with legal aid, tried unsuccessfully to meet the
Minister of Transport, P. S+unrec k.. <?*T
Sturrock said the Government was investigating the^toycott, and on December 4,
declared that the Government refused to subsidise, transport for blacks. Most em-
ployers would pay the increase. It would be impossible to confine a subsidy to
Alexandra.
It is also not understood why casual workers and
washerwomen are not also able to recover.this in-
creased charge since they are usually daily paid ^
workers, and this operation should, therefore, be
easier than those on a. weekly or monthly basis, ^f
The Council for Rights and Justice replied that there was no proof that the bus
service was running at a loss."/ At a meeting between the Minister of Native Affair
The Alexandra Health Committee and the bus proprietors, the proposal was made that
the increased fare should be introduced during peak hours; Basner rejected it as
nonsensical, tfl On December 8, Rheinaul t-Jones, who had sat on the Bus Commission,
suggested that the Government or the City Council should subsidise coupons7^nd on the
n ft
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11th the General Purposes Committee of the Council decided to recommend subsidisi
the services to the tune of £10,000, sufficient to absorb the increase for three
months. 10^ The Labour Party objected in principle to subsidies for private
companies. / O[
The Cabinet considered the boycott on the 12th, and there were expectations both
of a solution and the end of the boycott. tOZ But the Cabinet decided against a
subsidy and asked the City not to intervene in a matter outside of its jurisdicti
The Workers' Transport Action Committee announced that the boycott would continue
Members of the City Council criticised the Government's rejection of its offer
and urged that "bold action" was needed to restore the "faith of the Natives in
the administration." *°*> On the 19th . a motion was passed by the Council that
the City should buy the buses and apply for certificates, and that a railway to
Alexandra should be built.
/C
Amass meeting held in Alexandra on the 20th resolved to hold a sit-down strike.
This new development induced alarm among significant interests, and a hardening of
opinion. The Transvaal Chamber of Industries declared that the "natives would bt
placing their jobs in jeopardy."/C?* The WTAC invited trade unions to help with
the organisation of the strike, and deputations from the Committee interviewed
the Council of Native Trade Unions and the Labour Party, but the next day the
strike was postponed till the New Year.l&f
The Council's coupon scheme was put to a mass meeting in Alexandra and was rejecte
The Council for Rights and Justice placed a petition calling for a solution to the
problem was placed in St. Mary's cathedral; "so many queued up to sign that the
number of forms was inadequate and slips of paper had to be used."/// J.A.Fothe-
ringham said that Alexandra was unwise to reject the coupon scheme: "There are
influences at work which will thwart any endeavour we make to end this dispute."
He said that the boycott had gone on long enouejj, and "if the Natives agreed to the
new fare he would ask the bus owners to operate at 4d. until the coupons could
be printed." Radebe said the matter would have to be considered by the WTAC anc
accepted by a mass meeting*f(2> Substantially the same proposal was put to a meeti
of a sub-committee of the City Council at which representatives of the Chambers of
Commerce and Industry and deputations from the Alexandra Emergency Transport Com-
mittee and the WTAC were present. The scheme proposed a Ad. fare on week-days,
6d. on Saturday afternoons and 7d. on Sundays and public holidays. /'3
Although Basner was sceptical about the scheme being accepted by Alexandra, his
committee agreed to recommend acceptance to a mass meeting on New Year's day.
It is not clear whether he spoke on behalf of the WTAC or whether the latter
dissented, but they must have realised that there was little alternative. A
boycott would be difficult to keep going with one of its objectives in effect
secured, if only temporarily. A strike would be even more difficult to organise
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and sustain than a boycott. Moreover, with the threat of a strike, the levers c
white opinion were being pushed against the boycotters, and this opinion had been
critical for the maintenance of the boycott. In the meantime, the wheels were
in motion to concentrate control over the industry. Fotheringham announced the
intention of forming a public utility corporation.
The city fathers clearly disliked negotiating with groups, like the WTAC, which
regarded themselves as delegates. The mayor lectured the deputation to the
effect that a "robot had been created at Alexandra over which none had any contro
representatives should have the power to accept proposals and stand-by them. If
Alexandra residents did not use the busesi "they would have lost the sympathy of
the Johannesburg public for ever." //6"
The boycott was at an end. The mass meeting called in Alexandra on New Year's
Day, 1945, accepted the proposals for a coupon system subsidised by the City
Council. The buses started running again on the 4th; women of the Emergency
Transport Committee helped to regulate the queues .//fc In its editorial on the
morning of the 3rd, The Rand Daily Mail quoted with approval the opinion of the
Council for Rights and Justice that the solution to the dispute was a "triumph of
local initiative over the disorderly consequences of laissez faire and lack of
planning" and added its own view that
the Natives were wise to accept the Council's proposals.
All through the boycott, opinion has been on its side;
had they rejected this very reasonable plan it would have
definitely turned against them. And in that case they
could have achieved nothing, however long the boycott
might have continued. i/T
Other triumphs over disorderly forces were in train. As early as December 8, a
meeting had been held between a Council sub-committee and the bus owners to disci
the sale of the bus service to the Council.Ho The owners wanted £250,000, an offe:
which the sub-committee were "not disposed to Tecommend"//? and on the 19th, the
General Purposes Committee recommended that there was nothing further to be done.
Energised by the threat of a strike, the Council applied for certificates on the
23-rd, but the local Transportation Board turned down the application.
In the meantime, the owners had initiated discussions with Barregar of the Indust:
and Commercial Holdings group which bought the services for £175,000: on March 23,
1945, Barregar announced that a "public utility corporation" had been registered./
The substantive changes on the transport industry effected by the boycott was the
concentration in control over it; subsequent boycotts may have further entrenched
the concentration of control over black transportation.
But the political effects on the community cannot be so neatly measured, for
thereafter, with the example of Alexandra before them, more and more communities
took up the transport boycott as a weapon in the political struggle. The 1944
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boycott, fought on a smaller scale than many of the subsequent movements, raises
fundamental questions about the potentiality of the transport boycott in mobilisir
action in urban black communities. The issues were discussed by Edward Roux in
a short essay which stands as the most intelligent contemporary analysis of the
affair. Roux saw the second world war as a period of quiescence compared with
the political activity among Africans during the first world war:
Alexandra therefore stands out all the more sharply,
for it revealed a fervour, solidarity and grim deter-
mination of which any suppressed and struggling people
might well be proud. ^
He saw the 1943 boycott (and presumably the two earlier ones) as a "spontaneous
mass movement unprepared and owing little or nothing to political leadership."
The second "strike" was "well-prepared and had the support of a large committee
representing numerous African and pro-African organisations." Roux identified
three political groups in the 1944 boycott: the Communist party, the African
Democratic Party and a trotskyite off-shoot of the A.D.P.; these constituted
respectively a "right", a "centre" and a "left" in movement. During the strike
there was an attempt to widen the strike by mobilising Orlando and Eastern and
Western townships. The attempt failed, partly because of police action, and
partly because Orlando residents had already bought their monthly railway tickets.
There were also divisions among political groups over the practicality of attempt-
ing to widen the area, and conflicts over whether to accept the Council's coupon
scheme.
The conflict eventually came down to a split between those (the Communist"right")
who thought the boycott should end once some tangible benefit had been achieved
and those who felt it should continue until some larger changes had been achieved.
There seems little doubt in my mind that this (acceptance
of the 4d. coupon) was the correct line to take.
Leftists urged that the people should go on walking, that
they should demand a municipal or state-owned bus service.
They declared that the masses in Alexandra had become so
politically developed that they would stop at nothing less.
No doubt many irl Alexandra did realise the need for socia-
lised transport, but to go on walking after the raison
d'etre of the strike, the return of the 4d. fare, had been
decided, would be a counsel of perfection. Revolutionary
intransigence may declare that every struggle must be carried
to its ultimate limits, but the African people who have
suffered so many defeats and disappointments do well to
take and hold what they have won. A movement cannot live
and grow without an occasional foretaste of ultimate
victory..
Perceptive as it was, written so soon after the boycott, Roux's account suggests
a false distinction. The alternatives suggested in Roux's account (even after
making allowances for the optimistic diagnosis of nationalisation then fashionable
on the left) seem less important that the potentialities which different methods,
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mobilising different constituencies, offered for political action.
The distinctions which seem to be important in the context of township politics
lay between those methods which reinforced communal political autonomy and those
which dissipated the capacity of communities like Alexandra to achieve forms of
political organisation which could be taken up on future occasions. Where Roux
detected the alternatives to lie between small but immediately tangible victories
and larger but more remote ones, the distinction which is being made here suggest
that the important advances available to the boycott movements lay in the directi
whrch enhanced the capacity of community organisations to make and to make good,
the decisions they reached.
In these terms, the boycotts in Alexandra were by no means negligible, for the
community retained the capacity to continue to mount boycotts throughout the
forties and fifties. Yet the trajectory which the boycotts followed during this
period, and into the fifties (in Alexandra at least - other areas may have demon-
strated a different pattern) was to remove the boycott communities from effective
( •_
control over the boycotts.
The settlement which ended the 1944 boycott was reached between committees; true,
the boycott communities were represented on these committees, and the settlement
was accepted by a mass meeting as the only feasible course of action. But by th
stage, no other outcome could have been predicted of a movement in which commit-
tees debated "solutions" with the state and private interests on the basis of a
resource so precarious as the readiness of the community to walk to work each day
During the 1944 boycott, it was though each group of participants - the commit-
tees on the one hand, the boycotters on the other - became fixed in a ritual: the
committees moving to higher and higher levels in the governmental structure witho
generating any base independent of the boycotters; the latter marching armed with
the dogged faith that some result must come of their determination.
Several moments in the history of the boycotts of this period were decisive in
steering them on this trajectory; the collapse of the 1943 boycott with the
announcement of the Bus Commission, and its acceptance by significant groups in
and on the fringes of African politics as a victory; the failure of Orlando to
launch a sympathy boycott in 1944; the retreat from the decision to hold a strike
in December. But were alternative trajectories available, or were the limits to
popular action structurally determined by the situation of weakness of black
organisation, and by the position of the black working classes in the political
economy?
These questions are difficult to answer, but some understanding of the issue may
be possible if the earlier boycotts are regarded, not as brief preludes to the
later ones, but as truer models of community political action which worked for a
time, and from which the later ones departed. This is not to say that the boyco
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movements could have developed significantly by an endless repetition of the metfc
of the earlier ones, nor that such repetition would have been feasible; the 1944
boycott was from the beginning played on a larger stage. In fact, the boycottet
did go on repeating formulae which had been successful in earlier years in gettir
the bus companies to retreat. Their repetition of these formulae was a symptom
of ossification in the movements.
The early boycotts were successful, not because they discovered a method of actic
which could be used over and over, but because they revealed a constituency - the
community - which could be united over issues which bore vitally on the interests
of the most important classes, which could be mobilised to act together for
specific purposes. But were other possibilities available for community action
which were foreclosed by the direction which the boycotts assumed and which were
feasible within the severe constraints which operated on the community?
Poor peoples1 movements are severely constrained; the crises which stimulate dire
action do not permit a "choice" of issues or weapons. Moreover, the issues are
likely to involve activity of an intensely practical kind and to become symbols o
inspiration towards the achievement of long-term objectives. Finally, the peopl
involved in the protest tend to be excluded from the negotiations and resolutions
which the state and established interests attempt to use to divert protests. Ye
it was not only the state and the dominant interests which acted to put a brake
upon the protest, but many involved in the protest as sympathetic outsiders. Th'
liberals clearly had ambiguous feelings about the boycott, and sometimes spoke as
though their intention was to end the boycotts. But even on the left, there
were some who seemed to be sheep in wolves1 clothing, mounting conservative reso-
lutions on the basis of radical principles. This is not intended to denigrate
the efforts of the courageous and dedicated individuals who behaved in this way,
but is meant to underscore the constraints which operated on them.
Given these problems, what alternatives were available? That the boycotts held
other possibilities is evident from the alacrity with which wider political group;
moved in, and the importance which was attached to the boycotts by the various
agencies of the state and entrenched interests. Above all, alternatives were
implicit in the worries which boycotts evoked in white Johannesburg, including it:
liberals. Paul Guenault of the Institute of Race Relations expressed the fear
that the "orderly protest" would become a "violent one" and that the possibility
of a sit-down strike indicated a "drift towards desparate action." $%/•{ Imminek's
metaphor of the "robot at Alexandra" revealed the fears which civic powers had of
a community which took its own decisions and held its spokesmen to be delegates,
not representatives. It is interesting that in both cases, the crisis was reachc
with the threat of A sit-down strike.
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In part the fears of whites may be understood to reflect their anxiety that labou:
would be withdrawn from industry. Whether or not this was a serious possibility
in the circumstances is difficult to gauge in the absence of any clear informatioi
about the transactions between the WTAC, the trade unions and the Labour Party.
But it is likely that the early abortion of the sit-down strike movement followed
an appreciation by these parties of the difficulties involved in sustaining a
strike. More broadly, the fears of civic powers and liberal groups expressed
the disturbing possibility that the community was taking the matter beyond the
specific issue of transport and was seeking to explore ways of acting over the
range of structures in which it was encapsulated in the political economy.
Any conclusion about the nature and possibilities of popular protest which may
be drawn from these sketches must necessarily be tentative, but it would suggest
that to the extent that protests could be institutionalised - perhaps simply insof
as they could be "named" as boycotts, strikes, or whatever - they could be control
because they assumed a finite shape. Conversely, insofar as their purposes and
structure remained diffuse and inchoate, they could retain an open-ended capacity
which lay beyond the ability of political powers to control short of using
systematic and ruthless repression. The origins of popular political protests
are diffuse and generalised, yet in order to mobilise action, they need to coagulf
around some specific issue; in this case increases in transport costs.
Insofar as these issues affected different elements in the community they could
sustain diverse and diffuse objectives and purposes. In the case of Alexandra,
diffusion was developed by the interest in transport of two distinct, yet inter-
penetrating class formations - the working class and the petty bourgeoisie.
During the third boycott, the state achieved a strategic victory by defining the
issue in terms which transformed the problem into a technical-administrative one;
this victory was assisted by the perhaps unconscious collusion in the constructior
of the problem by liberal and left-wing white^roups and by African nationalist
organisations. The boycott that ended in 1944 promised during its dying days to
reverse these tendencies, to set the boycotts on a new direction which would
*
involve the community in its role as work-force,
, A theory of popular protest would .. • need to do three things: to state the
conditions under which specific issues are capable of "spreading"; to state the
capacity of the state and cognate institutions to specify and define the problem
in terms which could lead to a specific set of administrative and technical
solutions to it,including the development of co-optative structures which might
incorporate elements of the protest movement; and to state the conditions under
which these "solutions" might in turn be undermined by a redefinition of the
issues.
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